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“The Cold War was a 45-year-long Gray Zone Struggle.”1 – General Joseph L. Votel 
I. Core Concepts 
GRAY ZONES 
 Lohaus, Phillip. "A New Blueprint for Competing Below the Threshold: The Joint Concept for  
Integrated Campaigning." War on the Rocks. May 23, 2018. 
https://warontherocks.com/2018/05/a-new-blueprint-for-competing-below-the-
threshold-the-joint-concept-for-integrated-campaigning/. 
 
The JCIC was designed to solve a specific problem: how to apply the power of the 
American military when adversarial behavior falls below the threshold that would 
trigger a direct response. While the global distribution of America’s joint force positions 
it well to contribute to broader government strategies in the space “short of war,” such 
activities have mostly been limited to the domain of special operations forces. The JCIC 
marks an important step toward improving the ability of the entire military to 
contribute to international competition outside of combat. 
 
Dubik, James M., Nic Vincent. "America's Global Competitions: The Gray Zone in Context."  
Institute for the Study of War. February 2018. 
http://www.understandingwar.org/report/americas-global-competitions-gray-zone-
context. 
 
The actions that the leading powers must take to help resolve the competition with 
revisionists, the war with the revolutionaries, and chronic crises with the rogue are a key 
determinant of which future ultimately emerges. The United States must redirect itself, 
for currently it is not intellectually or organizationally in the right position and it is not 
leading sufficiently enough.  
 
Kay, Larry. “Managing the Gray Zone is a Gray Matter Challenge.” Small Wars Journal, July 27, 
2016. http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/managing-the-gray-zone-is-a-gray-
matterchallenge. 
 
Due to the unclear or “gray” nature of the problems and subsequent solutions, the U.S. 
is uncertain how to respond. Much of our focus thus far has been to address these 
problems as we have in the past in other unconventional conflicts, however, our 
methodologies, our cultural paradigms, and institutional habits inhibit our ability to 
create solutions other than those that we have used to address past problems. This 
                                                          
1 General Joseph L. Votel, USA, Lieutenant General Charles T. Cleveland, USA (Ret.) and Will Irwin. “Unconventional 
Warfare in the Gray Zone.” JFQ 80, (1st Quarter, 2016). National Defense University Press,  102. 
http://ndupress.ndu.edu/Media/News/News-Article-View/Article/643108/unconventional-warfare-in-the-gray-
zone/  
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paper promotes an alternative approach, which is to adopt a generative or systemic 
solution to ways in which to develop strategies to manage gray zone competitions by 
adapting officer career and education tracks to create a more operationally and 
intellectually excellent officer corps. 
 
Freier, Nathan P., Charles R. Burnett, William J. Cain, Jr., Christopher D. Compton, Sean M.  
Hankard, Robert S. Hume, Gary R. Kramlich, II, J. Matthew Lissner, Tobin A. Magsig, 
Daniel E. Mouton, Michael S. Muztafago, James M. Schultze, John F. Troxell, and Dennis 
G. Wille. Outplayed: Regaining Strategic Initiative in the Gray Zone. U.S. Army War 
College Press, 2016. June 7, 2016. 
http://strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=1325. 
 
It is in this “gray zone” – the awkward and uncomfortable space between traditional 
conceptions of war and peace – where the United States and its defense enterprise face 
systemic challenges to U.S. position and authority. Gray zone competition and conflict 
present fundamental challenges to U.S. and partner security and, consequently, should 
be important pacers for U.S. defense strategy. 
 
Echevarria II, Dr. Antulio J. Operating in the Gray Zone: An Alternative Paradigm for U.S. 
Military Strategy. U.S. Army War College Press, 2016. April 4, 2016. 
http://strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=1318. 
 
Recent events in Ukraine, Syria, Iraq, and the South China Sea continue to take 
interesting, if not surprising, turns. As a result, many security experts are calling for 
revolutionary measures to address what they wrongly perceive to be a new form of 
warfare, called “hybrid” or “gray zone” wars, but which is, in fact, an application of 
classic coercive strategies. These strategies, enhanced by evolving technologies, have 
exploited a number of weaknesses in the West’s security structures. To remedy one of 
those weaknesses, namely, the lack of an appropriate planning framework, this 
monograph suggests a way to re-center the current U.S. campaign-planning paradigm to 
make it more relevant to contemporary uses of coercive strategies.  
 
Brands, Hal. “Paradoxes of the Gray Zone.” Foreign Policy Research Institute. February 5,  
2016. 
http://www.fpri.org/article/2016/02/paradoxes-gray-zone/. 
 
Contrary to what skeptics argue, then, the gray zone is not an illusion. But if the concept 
does pack a punch, it is also elusive and even paradoxical. Edward Luttwak has written 
about the paradoxical logic of strategy – the fact that it seems to embody multiple, and 
seemingly contradictory, truths at once. In dealing with the gray zone, this basic 
proposition applies in spades. The gray zone concept may seem relatively 
straightforward at first glance. But upon closer inspection, it is fraught with 
complexities, contradictions, and ironies. These characteristics do not make the concept 
worthless or meaningless. They do, however, make it quite slippery. 
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Votel, General Joseph L. USA, Lieutenant General Charles T. Cleveland, USA (Ret.) and Will  
Irwin. “Unconventional Warfare in the Gray Zone.” Joint Force Quarterly no. 80 (January, 
2016). National Defense University Press. 
http://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/jfq/jfq-80/jfq-80_101-109_Votel-et-
al.pdf 
 
Unconventional warfare, whether conducted by the United States or Russia or any other  
state seeking to advance national interests through Gray Zone proxy warfare, has a rich  
history but continues to evolve to meet changing global conditions. One certainty in a  
world of continuing disorder, a world bereft of Cold War clarity and relative “stability,”  
where globalization has enabled almost continuous change, is that the UW mission must  
continue to adapt and so must those responsible for executing it. 
 
Mazarr, Michael J. "Struggle in the Gray Zone and World Order." War on the Rocks. December  
22, 2015. https://warontherocks.com/2015/12/struggle-in-the-gray-zone-and-world-
order/. 
 
The real significance of gray zone campaigns is in their relation to the most fundamental 
challenge of the coming decades: finding a way to integrate rising, quasi-revisionist 
powers into the international order. Our inability to do so is the basis for gray zone 
conflict; progress in that direction would make such campaigns less necessary and less 
worrisome.  
 
Kapusta, CAPT. Philip. “The Gray Zone” Special Warfare 28 no. 4 (October-December 2015):  
18-25. October 2015. 
http://www.soc.mil/swcs/SWmag/archive/SW2804/October%202015%20Special%20W
arfare.pdf 
 
The ambiguity making gray zones so vexing also makes them useful to statesmen. In 
fact, they are crucial to the conduct of international relations in defining the importance 
of situations to the parties involved. That is, states and non-states can ‘test the waters’ 
with gray zone activities to determine the relative strength of domestic and 
international commitment to an endeavor without resorting to the more lethal violence 
of war. In brief, gray zone conflicts are an immensely better alternative to full-scale 
wars. 
HYBRID WARFARE 
Kremidas-Courtney, Chris. "Countering Hybrid Threats in the Maritime Environment." Center  
for International Maritime Security. June 11, 2018. http://cimsec.org/countering-hybrid-
threats-in-the-maritime-environment/36553. 
 
Of course, these threats have always existed, but what makes hybrid threats different 
are the new vulnerabilities presented by a globalized world interconnected by instant 
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global communications, systems of finance, and commerce. Hybrid threats represent 
the weaponization of globalization. 
 
Cullen, Patrick. “Strategic Analysis May 2018: Hybrid Threats as a New ‘Wicked Problem’ for  
Early Warning.” June 4, 2018. https://www.hybridcoe.fi/publication-tags/strategic-
analysis/. 
 
Hybrid threats are designed to blur the distinction between peace and war, as well as 
complicate and fall below the target’s detection and response thresholds. The wicked 
problems created by hybrid threats require new solutions for early warning. 
 
Wither, James K. “Making Sense of Hybrid Warfare.” Connections: The Quarterly Journal 15,  
no. 2 (Spring 2016): 73-87. 
http://search.proquest.com/docview/1784582336?accountid=322. 
 
The term hybrid warfare has been widely analyzed by scholars, policymakers and 
commentators since Russia occupied Crimea in March 2014. The topic has ceased to be 
a subject only studied by military strategists, but has entered the wider policy domain as 
a significant security challenge for the West. This article seeks to place the debate about 
hybrid warfare in a broader analytical and historical context and summarizes discussion 
to date on this and related strategic concepts. The Russian approach to hybrid warfare 
as demonstrated by operations in Ukraine is a particular focus for discussion. 
 
Hoffman, Frank. Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars. Arlington, VA: Potomac  
Institute for Policy Studies, 2007. December 2007. 
http://www.potomacinstitute.org/images/stories/publications/potomac_hybridwar_01
08.pdf. 
 
Because of their perceived success, hybrid challenges will not be a passing fad nor will 
they remain focused on low tech applications. Future opponents will be dedicated, learn 
rapidly and adapt quickly to more efficient modes of killing. The ongoing Long War 
underscores their capacity for incorporating new tactics, techniques and procedures. 
This diffusion will continue. We can no longer overlook our own vulnerabilities or 
underestimate the imaginations of our antagonists. In the world of Hybrid Wars, the 
price for complacency grows steep. 
CYBER 
Stoltenberg, Jens. "How NATO Defends Against the Dark Side of the Web." WIRED, June 9,  
2018. https://www.wired.com/story/how-nato-defends-against-the-dark-side-of-the-
web/. 
 
For almost 70 years, NATO has been the bedrock of transatlantic security, whether on 
land, at sea, or in the air. The same is now true in cyberspace. A cyberattack can now 
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trigger Article 5 of NATO'S founding treaty, which states that an attack on one Ally is an 
attack on all Allies. 
 
Barker, Pete. "Undersea Cables and the Challenges of Protecting Seabed Lines of  
Communication." CIMSEC. March 15, 2018.  
http://cimsec.org/undersea-cables-challenges-protecting-seabed-lines-
communication/35889. 
 
Strategists have neglected submarine cables. Whilst topics such as piracy and cyber 
attacks on ports frequently arise in discussions on maritime threats, cables have not 
always been as prominent. Some authors have identified the potential risks (such as this 
2009 report for the UN Environment World Conservation Monitoring Centre), but these 
works have not always received the attention they deserve. 
 
Howard, Travis, and José De Arimatéia Da Cruz. "A Cyber Vulnerability Assessment of the U.S.  
Navy in the 21st Century." CIMSEC. January 31, 2017.  
http://cimsec.org/cyber-vulnerability-assessment-u-s-navy-21st-century/30405. 
 
With over 320,000 active duty personnel, 274 ships with over 20 percent of them 
deployed across the world at any one time, the Navy’s ability to securely communicate 
across the globe to its forces is crucial to its mission. In this age of rapid technological 
growth and the ever expanding internet of things, information security is a primary 
consideration in the minds of senior leadership of every global organization. The Navy is 
no different, and success or failure impacts far more than a stock price. 
 
Malekos Smith, Jessica. "Twilight Zone Conflicts: Employing Gray Tactics in Cyber Operations."  
Small Wars Journal, October 27, 2016.  
http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/twilight-zone-conflicts-employing-gray-tactics-in-
cyber-operations. 
 
In an opening that would perhaps make Rod Serling proud: There is a fifth dimension of 
warfare known to man as cyberspace – it is a dimension of infinite possibilities, 
representing an uncertain middle ground between peace and war. An amorphous realm, 
wherein actors are strategically employing gray tactics via cyber operations in ‘twilight 
zone conflicts.’ And while gray tactics like information operations, sabotage and 
economic coercion are not new to the pages of history, the medium for leveraging such 
tactics is. 
 
Thiele, Ralph D. "Game Changer – Cyber Security in the Naval Domain." ISPSW Strategy  
Series: Focus on Defense and International Security, no. 530 (January 2018).  
http://www.ispsw.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/530_Thiele.pdf. 
 
The systems and networks naval forces must protect are complex and large in size. Ships 
are increasingly using systems that rely on digitization, integration, and automation. 
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Offensive actors understand the naval reliance on communications, ISR, and 
visualization technologies, and perceive them as vulnerable to disruption and 
exploitation. Cyber has been moving from a supportive to a rather active role within an 
operational force. With today’s rapidly evolving threats, naval forces are well advised to 
develop a sense of urgency not only to develop cyber resilience capabilities that will 
enable them to “fight through”, but also cyber warfighting capabilities as these will be 
particularly valuable when they can be delivered reliably and in concert with other 
capabilities.  
 
Kruithof, Kristy, Judith Aldridge, David Decary Hetu, Megan Sim, Elma Dujso, and Stijn  
Hoorens. “Internet-Facilitated Drug Trade.” RAND. August 2016. 
http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1607.html 
 
This report analyses the size and scope of Internet-facilitated drugs trade both on the 
so-called clear and hidden web, paying special attention to the Netherlands, and 
delineates potential avenues for law enforcement for detection and intervention. 
 
Russell, Alison Lawlor. Cyber Blockades. Georgetown University Press, 2014. 
 
Cyber Blockades is the first book to examine the phenomena of blockade operations in 
cyberspace, large-scale attacks on infrastructure or systems that aim to prevent an 
entire state from sending or receiving electronic data. Cyber blockades can take place 
through digital, physical, and/or electromagnetic means. Blockade operations have 
historically been considered acts of war, thus their emergence in cyberspace has 
significant implications for international law and for our understanding of cyber warfare. 
DIS/INFORMATION CAMPAIGNS 
Gordon, Daniel. "Defending the Indefensible: A New Strategy for Stopping Information  
Operations." War on the Rocks. May 25, 2018.  
https://warontherocks.com/2018/05/defending-the-indefensible-a-new-strategy-for-
stopping-information-operations/. 
 
We can apply the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) strategies for 
combating emerging epidemics to contain the spread of viral information and reduce 
the effectiveness of information operations. The CDC’s strategies include educating the 
public, training responding personnel, using science and technology to understand 
transmission and treatment, and identifying specific areas in need of additional 
resources. That’s right, the CDC isn’t just for stopping zombie outbreaks. Its 
recommendations for containing emerging epidemics can help fill the gaps in, and 
improve effectiveness of, the response to information operations. 
CYBER LAW 
Schmitt, Michael N., and Liis Vihul, eds. Tallinn Manual 2.0 on the International Law Applicable  
to Cyber Operations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017. 
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The fact that international law is often dismissed as window-dressing on realpolitik is 
misleading. Such an approach understates the importance of international agreements 
in maintaining peace and security. For liberal democracies that respect the rule of law, 
international law undoubtedly shapes and bounds governments. Activities. At a time 
when the actions of unscrupulous States and violent extremist groups continue to 
threaten peace and security internationally, it is even more important that such actions 
are countered with a strong commitment to existing international law and the values 
that it represents. 
 
Gerstein, Daniel M. "Define Acceptable Cyberspace Behavior." The RAND Blog (blog),  
September 27, 2015.  
https://www.rand.org/blog/2015/09/define-acceptable-cyberspace-behavior.html. 
 
While a U.S.-China agreement is a welcome step, it also underscores the greater issues 
facing the United States, and indeed the international community, in this largely 
ungoverned space. It further highlights that a precondition for securing U.S. networks 
should be the development of an overarching cyber doctrine that defines the limits of 
acceptable behavior and allows the U.S. to defend its networks against current and 
future threats. 
 
Schmitt, Michael N. “The Law of Cyber Targeting.” Naval War College Review 68 no. 2(Spring, 
2015). https://ccdcoe.org/sites/default/files/multimedia/pdf/TP_07_2015.pdf. 
 
In light of the role which cyber operations are playing in contemporary conflicts, 
attention must be paid to the law that governs these activities because, to borrow a 
sports analogy, a team that takes the field without knowing the rules is usually going to 
lose, even if it is the better team. International law, and particularly IHL, exerts a 
powerful influence on tactics, operational planning and strategic decision-making in 
modern warfare. The fight can be won on the battlefield but lost in the court of public 
and international opinion when one side appears to have acted outside the law. Given 
the novelty of cyber operations as a method of warfare during an armed conflict, any 
alleged misuse, even at the tactical level, has the potential for strategic consequences.  
 
II. Maritime Gray Zones by Country 
RUSSIA 
GRAY ZONE STRATEGY 
Kabanenko, Ihor. "Russian Naval Exercises in Sea of Azov: A Prelude to ‘Hybrid’-Style  
Invasion?" Eurasia Daily Monitor 15, no. 78 (May 22, 2018). May 22, 2018.  
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https://jamestown.org/program/russian-naval-exercises-in-sea-of-azov-a-prelude-to-
hybrid-style-invasion/. 
 
On May 18, Moscow released a navigation alert for a section of the Sea of Azov, 
cautioning that Russian naval training exercises would make the area dangerous for 
maritime passage from 0500 to 1700 UTC, on May 21–23. The zone, which occupies 
2,000 square kilometers, has been closed to shipping traffic. Though the announcement 
quickly drew the attention of Ukrainian news outlets, the Russian state media has so far 
kept silent. 
 
Aliyev, Nurlan. “Russian Military Presence in Caspian Sea: Protection of National Interests or  
Military Muscle Flexing?” Jamestown Foundation, November 2, 2017. 
https://jamestown.org/program/russian-military-presence-in-caspian-sea-protection-of-
national-interests-or-military-muscle-flexing/ 
 
The Kremlin’s strategic vision regarding the protection of Russian national interests in 
the Caspian and barring outside powers from accessing the region has thus encouraged 
Moscow to increasingly flex its growing naval muscles there—as illustrated by the 
recent uptick in the Caspian Flotilla’s exercises and port visits. The result of these shows 
of force by Russia will put growing pressure on small countries in the region as well as 
potentially disrupt strategic transnational Caspian-basin projects the West is involved in. 
 
Altman, Jonathan. “Russian A2/AD In the Eastern Mediterranean: A Growing Risk.” Naval War  
College Review 69 no. 1. (Winter, 2016).  
http://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1119&context=nwc-
review. 
 
It is important for policy makers and strategists alike to recognize the serious strategic 
implications of a Russian A2/AD envelope in the eastern Mediterranean. Such an 
envelope would present grave challenges to U.S. influence in the region and would 
imperil the free flow of commerce that is essential to U.S. and global prosperity. It 
would be wise to take steps now to prepare for this threat rather than attempting to 
address it after it becomes realized. 
 
Kofman, Michael. "Russian Hybrid Warfare and Other Dark Arts." War on the Rocks. March 11,  
2016.  
https://warontherocks.com/2016/03/russian-hybrid-warfare-and-other-dark-arts/. 
 
Following Russia’s annexation of Crimea, hybrid warfare has become conversational 
short form in the West for describing Moscow’s sneaky ways of fighting war. If there’s 
one thing you’ve learned over the past two years about Russia, it’s that it uses hybrid 
warfare, a dangerous Kremlin innovation the West must learn to grapple with.  
 
Kasapoglu, Can. “Russia’s Renewed Military Thinking: Non-Linear Warfare and Reflexive  
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Control.” NATO Defense College, Research Division, no. 121 (November 2015). 
November 2015.  
http://cco.ndu.edu/Portals/96/Documents/Articles/russia's%20renewed%20Military%2
0Thinking.pdf. 
 
In both Crimea and the subsequent fighting in the Donbas region of Ukraine, Russia’s 
signature tactic has been the use of so-called “Green Men,” soldiers without identifying 
insignia whose identity as Russian soldiers the Kremlin denied. Ukraine, Georgia, and 
even NATO members like Estonia now fear that they could be the next target for 
Russia’s Green Men. NATO, alarmed by the need to prepare for this unexpected tactic, 
has committed to develop new countermeasures to defend against this threat. 
BALTIC INTERESTS 
Schaub, Gary, Jr., Martin Murphy, and Frank G. Hoffman. "Hybrid Maritime Warfare: Building  
Baltic Resilience." The RUSI Journal, April 3, 2017. 
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/03071847.2017.1301631?scroll=top&n
eedAccess=true. 
 
Russia’s use of hybrid warfare techniques has raised concerns about the security of the 
Baltic States. Gary Schaub, Jr, Martin Murphy and Frank G. Hoffman recommend a series 
of measures to augment NATO’s Readiness Action Plan in the Baltic region, including 
increasing the breadth and depth of naval exercises, and improving maritime domain 
awareness through cooperative programmes. 
 
Hicks, Kathleen, Lisa Sawyer Samp Andrew Metrick, and Kathleen Weinberger. Undersea  
Warfare in Northern Europe. CSIS International Security Program. July 21, 2016.  
https://www.csis.org/analysis/undersea-warfare-northern-europe. 
 
In this report, the CSIS International Security Program analyzes Russian intentions and 
capabilities in the near to mid-term and the ability of NATO and partner nations to 
respond effectively to Russian activities in the undersea domain. The assessment 
identifies gaps in current Western organizations, capabilities, and posture and offers 
recommendations as to how NATO and partner nations can meet the Russian challenge 
in the undersea domain. 
RUSSIAN PROXIES 
Vojtiskova, Vladka, Hubertus Schmid-Schmidsfelden, Vít Novotny, and Kristina Potapova. The  
Bear in Sheep’s Clothing: Russia’s Government-Funded Organisations in the EU. 
Publication. July 2016. http://www.martenscentre.eu/sites/default/files/publication-
files/russia-gongos.pdf. 
 
This paper sheds light on organisations operating in Europe that are funded by the 
Russian government, whether officially or unofficially. These include government-
organised non-governmental organisations, non-governmental organisations, and think 
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tanks. Their goal is to shift European public opinion towards a positive view of Russian 
politics and policies, and towards respect for its great power ambitions. In light of 
Russia’s annexation of Crimea and Russian aggression in Eastern Ukraine, the overt or 
covert support for these organisations must become a matter of concern to the EU.  
 
Lutsevych, Orysia. Agents of the Russian World: Proxy Groups in the Contested 
Neighbourhood. Publication. Chatham House. Russian and Eurasia Programme. April 
2016. 
https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/publications/research/2016-
04-14-agents-russian-world-lutsevych.pdf. 
 
Russia employs a vocabulary of ‘soft power’ to disguise its ‘soft coercion’ efforts aimed 
at retaining regional supremacy. Russian pseudo-NGOs undermine the social cohesion 
of neighbouring states through the consolidation of pro-Russian forces and ethno-
geopolitics; the denigration of national identities; and the promotion of anti-US, 
conservative Orthodox and Eurasianist values. They can also establish alternative 
discourses to confuse decision-making where it is required, and act as destabilizing 
forces by uniting paramilitary groups and spreading aggressive propaganda.  
RUSSIAN CYBER 
Krekό, Péter, Lóránt Győri, Jekatyerina Dunajeva, Jakub Janda, Ondřej Kundra, Grigorij  
Mesežnikov, Juraj Mesík, Maciej Szylar and Anton Shekhovtsov. “The Weaponization of 
Culture: Kremlin’s Traditional Agenda and the Export of Values to Central Europe.” 
Political Capital Institute. August 4, 2016. 
http://www.politicalcapital.hu/search.php?article_read=1&article_id=66. 
 
Political Capital’s most recent study explores the topic of Russian soft power in Hungary, 
Slovakia, the Czech Republic, Poland and Austria. In the involved countries, the Kremlin 
purposefully aims at monopolising, manipulatively representing and disseminating 
“traditional” societal and Christian values used to ideologically underpin the system. 
Putin contrasts the allegedly “nihilistic” and “decadent” West with the Christian-
conservative Russia and this way he tries to present his own autocracy’s moral 
superiority. 
 
Lucas, Edward, and Peter Pomeranzev. “Winning the Information War: Techniques and  
Counterstrategies to Russian Propaganda in Central and Eastern Europe.” Center for 
European Policy Analysis / Legatum Institute. August 2, 2016. 
https://cepa.ecms.pl/files/?id_plik=2715. 
 
The Russian government uses disinformation, incitement to violence and hate speech to 
destroy trust, sap morale, degrade the information space, erode public discourse and 
increase partisanship. Our ability to respond is constrained by the mainstream media’s 
loss of reach and impact. Its myth-busting and fact-checking reaches only a limited 
audience – and probably not the one the Kremlin is targeting. The response involves a 
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contradiction: our approach must be tailored to different audiences, yet must also seek 
to build trust between polarized groups. Our recommendations include tactical, 
strategic and long-term priorities, targeted partly at Kremlin disinformation and also 
aiming to strengthen media in democracies and educate audiences. 
 
Rojansky, Matthew. “Tinker Tailor Soldier Hacker: The Russian Factor in the DNC Email  
Scandal.” Kennan Institute. July 27, 2016. https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/tinker-
tailor-soldier-hacker-the-russian-factor-the-dnc-email-scandal. 
 
Allegations that hackers linked to the Russian government have broken into DNC servers 
and leaked emails are consistent with the current dire state of U.S.-Russian 
relations.  But not all of the implications that have been drawn, including about the 
Kremlin’s likely motives, ring true.  Let’s take the key questions raised one at a time. 
 
“Internet Trolling as a Hybrid Warfare Tool: The Case of Latvia.” NATO Strategic  
Communications Centre of Excellence. February 2016. 
http://www.stratcomcoe.org/internet-trolling-hybrid-warfare-tool-case-latvia-0. 
 
In order to analyse how pro-Russian trolling is used to influence the public opinion in 
NATO-member countries the NATO StratCom COE commissioned the study Internet 
Trolling as a Tool of Hybrid Warfare: The Case of Latvia. The study was conducted by the 
Latvian Institute of International Affairs in cooperation with Riga Stradins University, and 
was aimed at analysing organized pro-Russian trolling in internet media to measure its 
impact on public opinion in Latvia. 
 
Paul, Christopher, and Miriam Matthews. “The Russian ‘Firehose of Falsehood’ Propaganda 
Model: Why It Might Work and Options to Counter It.” RAND Corporation. 2016. 
http://www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/PE198.html. 
 
Since its 2008 incursion into Georgia (if not before), there has been a remarkable 
evolution in Russia's approach to propaganda. The country has effectively employed 
new dissemination channels and messages in support of its 2014 annexation of the 
Crimean peninsula, its ongoing involvement in the conflicts in Ukraine and Syria, and its 
antagonism of NATO allies. The Russian propaganda model is high-volume and 
multichannel, and it disseminates messages without regard for the truth. It is also rapid, 
continuous, and repetitive, and it lacks commitment to consistency.  
 
Chen, Adrian. “The Agency.” New York Times Magazine. June 2, 2015. 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/07/magazine/the-agency.html. 
 
From a nondescript office building in St. Petersburg, Russia, an army of well-paid “trolls” 
has tried to wreak havoc all around the Internet – and in real-life American 
communities. 
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Walker, Shaun. “The Russian troll factory at the heart of the meddling allegations.” The  
Guardian. April 2, 2015. 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/apr/02/putin-kremlin-inside-russian-troll-
house. 
 
Former workers tell how hundreds of bloggers are paid to flood forums and social 
networks at home and abroad with anti-western and pro-Kremlin comments. 
CHINA:  
GRAY ZONE STRATEGY 
Holmes, James, Toshi Yoshihara. “Five Shades of Chinese Gray-Zone Strategy”. The National  
Interest, May 2, 2017. 
http://nationalinterest.org/feature/five-shades-chinese-gray-zone-strategy-20450. 
 
This typology of gray-zone tactics suggests that China is bringing to bear all elements of 
national power on the maritime disputes in the East and South China Seas. Beijing has 
employed legal, diplomatic, maritime and material elements of statecraft to chip away 
at the U.S.-led liberal international order. Even its construction prowess, honed over 
decades of massive infrastructure-building, has been on dazzling display in the heart of 
the South China Sea – contributing to strategic success. 
 
Green, Michael, Kathleen Hicks, Zack Cooper, John Schaus and Jake Douglas. “Countering  
Coercion in Maritime Asia: The Theory and Practice of Gray Zone Deterrence”. Center 
for Strategic & International Studies. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2017. 
https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-
public/publication/170505_GreenM_CounteringCoercionAsia_Web.pdf?OnoJXfWb4A5g
w_n6G.8azgEd8zRIM4wq. 
 
The inability of U.S. policymakers to deter coercive actions or to articulate a coherent 
gray zone strategy has raised questions about Washington’s ability to protect U.S. 
interests, to integrate China into the international order, and to maintain existing 
alliance commitments. As a result, experts in the United States and in East Asia are 
searching for new approaches to counter coercion in the East and South China Seas. 
 
Kania, Elsa. “The PLA’s Latest Strategic Thinking on the Three Warfares.” China Brief 16, no. 13. 
August 22, 2016. Jamestown Foundation. 
http://www.jamestown.org/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=45723&tx_ttnews%5Bb
ackPid%5D=7&cHash=229badbe854a0bdac91aaf401e3f9744. 
 
Beijing’s response to the unfavorable South China Sea arbitration outcome has 
highlighted an important aspect of its military strategy, the “three warfares” (三战). 
Consisting of public opinion warfare (舆论战), psychological warfare (心理战), and legal 
warfare (法律战), the three warfares have been critical components of China’s strategic 
UNCLASSIFIED DOCUMENT- Inquiries to CIWAG at USNWC  ciwag@usnwc.edu. 
16 | P a g e  
 
approach in the South China Sea and beyond. In peacetime and wartime alike, the 
application of the three warfares is intended to control the prevailing discourse and 
influence perceptions in a way that advances China’s interests, while compromising the 
capability of opponents to respond. 
 
Harold, Scott W., Yoshiaki Nakagawa, Junichi Fukuda, John A. Davis, Keiko Kono, Dean  
Cheng, and Kazuto Suzuki. The U.S.-Japan Alliance and Deterring Gray Zone Coercion in 
the Maritime, Cyber, and Space Domains. 2017. 
https://www.rand.org/pubs/conf_proceedings/CF379.html. 
 
The United States and Japan face a dilemma: China is trying to change the status quo in 
the Indo-Pacific without firing a shot, gradually shifting the strategic playing field 
through the employment of gray zone coercion, or coercive moves that lie below the 
threshold that would trigger a military response. China's actions in the maritime, cyber, 
and (potentially) space domains challenge the status quo in ways that damage the 
interests of both Japan and the United States and are intended to erode trust in U.S. 
extended deterrence commitments. The RAND Corporation convened a pair of public 
conferences where experts from the United States and Japan presented papers focused 
on the challenges of deterrence by denial and deterrence by punishment in these three 
domains. 
AFRICA 
Asia Times Staff. "‘Significant’ Consequences if China Takes Over Djibouti Port, Says U.S.  
General." Asia Times, March 8, 2018. http://www.atimes.com/article/significant-
consequences-china-takes-djibouti-port-says-us-general/. 
 
The top US military commander in charge of US troops in Africa is worried about China’s 
growing presence on the continent, he suggested in remarks in a congressional hearing 
on Tuesday. Marine General Thomas Waldhauser said in his remarks to lawmakers that 
China could theoretically cut off supplies to a US base in the northeast African nation of 
Djibouti, if they “took” the port there. 
 
Fei, John. “China’s Overseas Military Base in Djibouti: Features, Motivations, and Policy  
Implications”. China Brief, December 22, 2017. https://jamestown.org/program/chinas-
overseas-military-base-djibouti-features-motivations-policy-implications/. 
 
The Chinese facility is near the U.S.’ sole military base in Africa – Camp Lemonnier – and 
signals China’s interest in protecting its growing economic and security interests in 
Africa and the Indian Ocean. While the base reflects China’s growing economic and 
security ambitions, it is unclear at present whether the facility represents just an effort 
for China to enhance its peacekeeping and humanitarian and disaster relief capabilities, 
or suggests greater ambitions. If, as some reports suggest, China does open more 
military bases in African and the Indian Ocean region, then the Djibouti base would 
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mark the beginning of a sea-change in Chinese naval ambitions in the Indian Ocean 
region. 
EAST & SOUTH CHINA SEAS 
“Occupation and Island Building.” Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative.  
https://amti.csis.org/island-tracker/. 
 
Five claimants occupy nearly 70 disputed reefs and islets spread across the South China 
Sea. They have built more than 90 outposts on these contested features, many of which 
have seen expansion in recent years. AMTI has gathered satellite imagery of each 
outpost, along with other relevant information, to document their current status and 
any changes they have undergone in recent years. 
 
Armour, Michael D. “The U.S. Coast Guard in the South China Sea: Strategy or Folly?”  
CIMSEC. November 6, 2017. http://cimsec.org/u-s-coast-guard-south-china-sea-
strategy-folly/34648. 
 
Recently there has been discussions at the highest level of the U.S. military concerning 
the deployment of U.S. Coast Guard assets to the South China sea and integrating them 
into the freedom of navigation operations conducted by the U.S. Navy relating to the 
manmade atolls constructed by the Chinese and subsequently claimed as Chinese 
sovereign territory. It may be that these U.S. Coast Guard units, if deployed to the area, 
may turn out to be a combat multiplier or a diplomatic plus. However, given the meager 
USCG budget and the limited assets of the service, their deployment may prove to be 
insignificant or even fraught with danger. 
 
Lansing, Shawn. “The Coast Guard Can Reduce Risk in The South China Sea.” United States 
Naval Institute. Proceedings. 143 no. 8 (August, 2017):26-31. 
https://search.proquest.com/docview/1933850606?accountid=322. 
 
Lansing discusses how the US Coast Guard can reduce risk in the South China Sea. With 
its regional partnerships and experience strengthening maritime law enforcement 
regimes, the US Coast Guard is uniquely suited to address the need for greater 
governance in the disputed waters of the South China Sea. Debates over whether the US 
and China can escape violent confrontation or about China's use of "little blue men" to 
carry out "small-stick diplomacy" are fitting as tension in the South China Sea roils one 
of the world's most significant sea lines of communication. 
 
Dutton, Peter. “A Maritime or Continental Order for Southeast Asia and the South China Sea?”  
Naval War College Review 69, no. 3. (Summer, 2016), 5-13. http://digital-
commons.usnwc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1158&context=nwc-review. 
 
Global maritime access and the security it provides, unlike the air we breathe, do not 
just exist as a state of nature. They must be established and then regularized through 
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laws and institutions that support them. And then ... they must be defended through 
political, economic, and military means when challenged. 
 
Martinson, Ryan D. "China's Second Navy." U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings Magazine, 1346th  
ser., 141, no. 4 (April 2015). https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2015-04-
0/chinas-second-navy. 
 
While the world has been busy watching China’s blue-water naval buildup, the People’s 
Republic has been steadily exploiting maritime law enforcement – and its coast guard – 
as an instrument of statecraft. 
 
Leaf, Paul J. "Learning from China’s Oil Rig Standoff with Vietnam." The Diplomat, August 30,  
2014. https://thediplomat.com/2014/08/learning-from-chinas-oil-rig-standoff-with-
vietnam/. 
 
China’s overreach was costly, among other things it accelerated a developing arms race 
in Asia and amplified calls for Washington and Tokyo to counter Beijing. Still, China 
acquired useful information to hone its ongoing strategy in the South China Sea. 
Understanding why Beijing took this action and its attendant lessons will help 
Washington and its partners deal with China. 
CHINESE PROXIES 
Erickson, Andrew S., and Conor M. Kennedy. “Countering China’s Third Sea Force: Unmask  
Maritime Militia Before They’re Used Again.” The National Interest, July 6, 2016. 
http://nationalinterest.org/feature/countering-chinas-third-sea-force-unmask-
maritime-militia-16860. 
 
When the Permanent Court of Arbitration in the Hague announces its rulings on the 
Philippines-initiated maritime legal case with China on July 12 – likely rejecting some key 
bases for excessive Chinese claims in the South China Sea – the Maritime Militia will 
offer a tempting tool for Beijing to try to teach Manila (and other neighbors) a lesson 
while frustrating American ability to calm troubled waters. This major problem with 
significant strategic implications is crying out for greater attention, and effective 
response. Accordingly, this article puts China’s Maritime Militia under the spotlight to 
explain what it is, why it matters and what to do about it. 
 
Erickson, Andrew S., and Conor M. Kennedy. “Irregular Forces at Sea: Not ‘Merely Fishermen’-  
Shedding Light on China’s Maritime Militia.” CIMSEC. November 2, 2015. 
http://cimsec.org/new-cimsec-series-on-irregular-forces-at-sea-not-merely-
fishermenshedding-light-on-chinas-maritime-militia/19624. 
 
Maritime militia, dead ahead! In a just-published Defense News article, Chris Cavas has 
made an important contribution to our understanding of the operations and 
applications of China’s irregular maritime forces. The forces he describes are almost 
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certainly neither ordinary merchant ship operators nor random fishermen, but rather 
militiamen operating in pre-planned roles in conjunction with USS Lassen’s Freedom of 
Navigation Operation in the South China Sea on 27 October 2015. 
 
Erickson, Andrew, Conor Kennedy. “Directing China’s ‘Little Blue Men’: Uncovering the  
Maritime Militia Command Structure”. Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, 
September 11, 2015. 
https://amti.csis.org/directing-chinas-little-blue-men-uncovering-the-maritime-militia-
command-structure/. 
 
While Russia has employed “Little Green Men” surreptitiously in Crimea, China uses its 
own “Little Blue Men” to support Near Seas claims. As the U.S. military operates near 
Beijing’s artificially-built South China Sea features and seeks to prevent Beijing from 
ejecting foreign claimants from places like Second Thomas Shoal, it may well face 
surveillance and harassment from China’s maritime militia. Washington and its allies and 
partners must therefore understand how these irregular forces are commanded and 
controlled, before they are surprised and stymied by them. 
CHINESE CYBER 
Rogoway, Tyler, and Joseph Trevithick. "What Secretive Anti-Ship Missile Did China Hack from  
the U.S. Navy?" The Drive, June 8, 2018. http://www.thedrive.com/the-war-
zone/21414/what-supersonic-anti-ship-missile-did-china-hack-from-the-u-s-navy. 
 
China's relentless cyber espionage campaign against the Pentagon has been one of the 
central reasons why that country's technological warfighting capabilities have 
aggressively matured over a relatively short period of time. In fact, we now see the 
fruits of their hacking operations on a daily basis via advanced 'indigenous' weapon 
systems, some which are now entering into operational service. But a previously 
unreported intrusion into a Navy contractor's computer network has provided the 
Chinese military with information on the service's electronic warfare and threat library, 
cryptographic radio systems used on submarines, specific sensor data, and detailed 
information on a previously undisclosed and fast-paced initiative to field a supersonic 
anti-ship missile onto American nuclear submarines dubbed Sea Dragon. 
 
Adams, Michael. “Why the OPM Hack IS Far Worse Than You Imagine.” Lawfare. March 11, 
2016. https://www.lawfareblog.com/why-opm-hack-far-worse-you-imagine. 
 
The Office of Personnel Management (“OPM”) data breach involves the greatest theft of 
sensitive personnel data in history. But, to date, neither the scope nor scale of the 
breach, nor its significance, nor the inadequate and even self-defeating response has 
been fully aired. 
IRAN 
GRAY ZONE STRATEGY 
UNCLASSIFIED DOCUMENT- Inquiries to CIWAG at USNWC  ciwag@usnwc.edu. 
20 | P a g e  
 
Gilmore, T.J. "Iran Owns the Gray Zone." Proceedings Magazine, March 2018.  
https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2018-03/iran-owns-gray-zone. 
 
Iran’s “gray zone” strategy has significant implications for the U.S. Navy despite the 
conventional maritime superiority the United States currently maintains in the eastern 
Mediterranean and throughout the Central Command area of responsibility. With 
proxies in Syria and Yemen, and the bulk of its navy based in Bandar Abbas, Iran is well 
positioned to hold the U.S. Navy at risk in the Strait of Hormuz, the Bab el-Mandeb, and 
increasingly the waters off the Levant. To meet this threat, the Navy needs to 
understand fully Iran’s current capabilities and objectives in the gray zone, train and 
exercise to recognize and combat this unique type of aggression, and demonstrate a 
willingness to escalate the competition to be successful. 
 
Ryan, Missy, and Thomas Gibbons-Neff. “Navy Patrol Ship Fires Warning Shots at Iranian  
Vessel in one of Several Confrontations.” Washington Post, August 25, 2016. 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2016/08/25/u-s-navy-
callshigh-speed-approach-by-iranian-ships-dangerous-harassment/. 
 
The incidents are the latest sign of US-Iranian friction near Iran’s coast. In January, a 
group of US sailors was detained overnight by Iranian personnel after their boats veered 
into Iranian waters. It was an embarrassment for the Obama administration and 
resulted in disciplinary action for some of the US personnel involved in that incident. 
 
U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence. “Iran’s Naval Forces: From Guerilla Warfare to a Modern Naval 
Strategy.” Suitland, MD: Office of Naval Intelligence, 2009. 
https://www.worldcat.org/wcpa/oclc/772609558?page=frame&url=http%3A%2F%2Fha
ndle.dtic.mil%2F100.2%2FADA510110%26checksum%3D35c9bca545ab247801ebce015
d748b9a&title=&linktype=digitalObject&detail=. 
 
Iran's naval forces, like the country itself, have been shaped by the Islamic revolution, 
petroleum, and an often adversarial relationship with neighboring countries and the 
international community as a whole. These factors have influenced how Iran's naval 
forces are organized, how they are equipped and manned, and how they interact with 
external forces. 
 
Kahwaji, Riad. “Iran’s Strategy at Sea ‘Guerrilla Warfare’ by Small, Fast Ships would Greet U.S.  
If War Breaks Out.” Navy Times, May 22, 2006. 
http://usnwc.idm.oclc.org/login?url=http://search.proquest.com/docview/203963287?
accountid=322. 
 
Boats and midget submarines loaded with high explosives also could ram giant oil 
tankers or aircraft carriers in suicide attacks, said Qassem Jaafar, a defense analyst 
based in Doha, Qatar. Kazemi assessed April's small-boat maneuvers in this way: "In an 
enclosed, narrow and rather shallow region such as the Persian Gulf, this tactic can be 
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very decisive against large units and can deny the enemy from effective deployment, 
sea lines of communication and power projection." 
IRANIAN PROXIES 
"Saudi-Led Coalition Foils Houthi Attacks on Red Sea Ships, Saudi and UAE Media Say."  
Thomson Reuters, May 23, 2018. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-yemen-security-
tanker/saudi-led-coalition-foils-houthi-attacks-on-red-sea-ships-saudi-and-uae-media-
say-idUSKCN1IO15P. 
 
A Saudi-led military coalition foiled attacks by explosives-laden speedboats deployed by 
Yemen’s Iran-aligned Houthi movement against commercial vessels, including an oil 
tanker, in the Red Sea, Saudi and Emirati state media said on Wednesday. 
 
Farrukh, Maher, Tyler Nocita, and Emily Estelle. “Warning Update: Iran’s Hybrid Warfare in  
Yemen.”  Critical Threats. March 26, 2017. 
https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/warning-update-irans-hybrid-warfare-in-
yemen. 
 
Iran may deploy more advanced military capabilities to Yemen to support the al Houthi-
Saleh faction, which faces increasing pressure. Iran has provided al Houthi-Saleh forces 
with sophisticated arms and advisors from its proxy network, including Afghan and Shia 
Arab specialists. The deployment of interoperable proxy forces is part of Iran’s evolution 
of a form of hybrid warfare that will allow it to project significant force far from its 
borders and fundamentally alter the balance of power in the region. 
IRANIAN CYBER 
Groll, Elias. “Spear Phishing in Tehran.” Foreign Policy, August 9, 2016.  
http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/08/09/spear-phishing-in-tehran/. 
 
Aggressive surveillance remains a key tool in the regime’s attempt to maintain power, 
and today, having sophisticated snooping software installed on one’s computer can be 
as easy as opening the wrong attachment or clicking on a pernicious link. Quietly, 
software is downloaded in the background and begins communicating with whomever 
has selected you for surveillance. Hackers working on behalf of Iran frequently turn to a 
method known as spear phishing - the use of an email that appears to come from a 
legitimate account but actually contains a malicious attachment or link – in order to 
install spyware on their targets’ digital devices. 
 
Scott-Railton, John, Bahr Abdul Razzak, Adam Hulcoop, Matt Brooks, and Katie Kleemola.  
"Group5: Syria and the Iranian Connection." The Citizen Lab. August 2, 2016. 
https://citizenlab.org/2016/08/group5-syria/. 
 
Elements of the Syrian opposition have been targeted by malware campaigns since the 
early days of the conflict: regime-linked malware groups, the Syrian Electronic Army, 
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ISIS, and a group linked to Lebanon reported by FireEye in 2015 have all attempted to 
penetrate opposition computers and communications. Some of these operations are 
still active as of the time of writing. This report adds one more threat actor to the list: 
Group5, which we name to reflect the four other known malware groups. 
III. Innovation & Adaptation  
TECHNOLOGY  
"Making Gray-Zone Activity More Black and White." DARPA News and Events. March 14, 2018.  
https://www.darpa.mil/news-events/2018-03-14. 
 
To better understand and respond to an adversary’s gray-zone engagement, DARPA’s 
Strategic Technology Office today announced a new program called COMPASS, which 
stands for Collection and Monitoring via Planning for Active Situational Scenarios. The 
program aims to develop software that would help clarify enemy intent by gauging an 
adversary’s responses to various stimuli. COMPASS will leverage advanced artificial 
intelligence technologies, game theory, and modeling and estimation to both identify 
stimuli that yield the most information about an adversary’s intentions, and provide 
decision makers high-fidelity intelligence on how to respond–-with positive and negative 
tradeoffs for each course of action. 
 
Werner, Ben. "VIDEO: Houthi Forces Capture U.S. Navy Unmanned Underwater Vehicle Off  
Yemen." USNI. January 3, 2018. https://news.usni.org/2018/01/03/houthi-rebels-find-
likely-u-s-navy-unmanned-underwater-vehicle. 
 
In the video posted online by local media on Monday, four men described as members 
of the “Houthi Navy” in dive gear are surrounding what appears to be a REMUS 600 UUV 
with the name “Smokey” printed on the body. According to the AMN News web posting, 
the Houthis discovered the UUV within the past week somewhere off the coast of 
Yemen. 
 
Jennings, Ralph. "What an American Naval Drone Could Tell Us about the Future of U.S.-China  
Relations." Forbes, December 19, 2016. 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/ralphjennings/2016/12/19/how-an-american-
underwater-drone-reached-the-contested-south-china-sea/#566abd0cd507. 
 
The Chinese seizure on Thursday of a U.S. Navy underwater drone that was exploring 
the widely disputed South China Sea raises the specter of another massive Sino-U.S. 
spat, even though President-elect Donald Trump loudly tweeted at China: “let them 
keep it!” But the discovery of a U.S. drone in a politicized ocean on the other side of the 
world raises sticky questions that will become ever more relevant as China and the 
United States square off in the months, or years, ahead. 
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Bana, Sarosh. "China's Underwater Great Wall." The Washington Times, August 30, 2016.  
https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2016/aug/30/chinas-underwater-great-wall/. 
 
The stakes in the South China Sea (SCS) are apparently reaching down to the murky 
depths of this contentious waterway as Beijing readies its undersea surveillance 
network to consolidate its presence in the region. 
STRATEGY & OPERATIONS 
LITTORAL CONFLICT 
Vego, Milan. "On Littoral Warfare." Naval War College Review 68, no. 2 (Spring 2015): 30-68.  
https://search.proquest.com/docview/1660144761?accountid=322. 
 
Naval warfare in the littorals has much in common with war conducted on the open 
ocean. However, there are also some significant differences, due to the extremely 
complex, dynamic, and challenging physical environment of the former. The 
peculiarities of the physical environment in the littorals offer many challenges – but also 
opportunities – in the employment of naval forces and aircraft. Distinctions between 
characteristics of war on the open ocean and in the littorals must be thoroughly 
understood; otherwise, commanders and their staffs simply cannot plan or employ their 
forces properly. 
 
Galdorisi, George. “The Littoral Combat Ship: New Neighbor in the Asia-Pacific.” Defence  
Review Asia 8, no. 5 (July 2014): 18-21. 
http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=tsh&AN=96735516&site=ehos
t-live. 
 
The article presents information on the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) in the U.S. Navy. The 
LCS ship was designed to be a focused-mission ship and is the newest surface combatant 
operating in the Asia-Pacific region. Some of the primary missions of the LCS ship are 
antisubmarine warfare, mine countermeasures, and surface warfare against small boats. 
SMALL BOATS 
McNeil, Jena Baker. “Getting the Small-Boat Threat Right.” Heritage Foundation. August 23,  
2010. http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2010/08/getting-the-small-boat-
threat-right. 
 
“Small craft” defines any boat that weighs under 300 tons and is less than 100 feet in 
length; the majority, however, are far smaller. Arguably, each one of these crafts 
represents a potential waterborne improvised explosives device or the means of 
delivering a weapon of mass destruction. Nevertheless, the small-boat threat is less 
acute than other security challenges, and despite the vast numbers of boats present, the 
threat may be managed. 
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“Small Boats.” Robert Strauss Center for International Security and Law.  
https://www.strausscenter.org/hormuz/small-boats.html. 
 
Small boats have been used throughout the last century in asymmetric warfare attacks 
on both military and civilian targets, combating a materially superior adversary without 
direct confrontation. The Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps operates a fleet of "˜small 
boats' estimated at more than 1000 boats. The Iranians harassed tanker traffic during 
the Tanker War using small boats. Many, including the U.S. Navy, suspect that any 
Iranian effort to close the Strait would include the use of small boats, potentially in 
suicide attacks. 
 
“Small Vessel Security Strategy” Department of Homeland Security. April 2008. 
http://www.dhs.gov/small-vessel-security-strategy. 
 
The Small Vessel Security Strategy addresses the risk that small vessels might be used to 
smuggle terrorists or weapon of mass destruction into the United States or might be 
used as either a stand-off weapon platform or as a means of a direct attack with a 
waterborne improvised explosive device. This strategy also describes the small vessel 
community and the environment in which it operates. 
NON-STATE NAVIES 
Rawley, Chris, and Claude Berube. "The Non-State Navy: Sea Shepherd as a Case Study for  
21st Century Maritime Non-State Actors." Small Wars Journal, July 23, 2013. 
http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/the-non-state-navy-sea-shepherd-as-a-case-study-
for-21st-century-maritime-non-state-actors. 
 
Examining Sea Shepherd’s goals, strategies, platforms, and tactics is a worthwhile 
endeavor because it serves as a model to understand the motives, operations, and 
threat posed by emerging maritime non-state actors.  Understanding the irregular 
challenges these MNSAs pose can help navies and coast guards respond to similarly-
structured groups in the future. 
 
Povlock, Paul A. "A Guerilla War at Sea: THE SRI LANKAN CIVIL WAR." Small Wars Journal,  
September 9, 2011. http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a549049.pdf. 
 
The rebel Tamil Tigers required secure sea lines of communication to supply their forces 
with the apparatus of modern warfare and used the open maneuver space of the sea to 
attack the Sri Lankan armed forces, government and economy.  Over time, the Sea 
Tigers, the insurgent maritime force, developed into a highly capable and aggressive 
organization that was able to operate in all maritime domains across the spectrum of 
conflict. 
SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES 
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the Gray Zone.” Small Wars Journal, June 20, 2016. 
http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/perception-is-reality-sof-in-the-gray-zone. 
 
This thesis examines two case studies of special operations forces use in the Gray Zone – 
in Somalia in 1992–1993 and the Philippines in 2000–2015. Using the bureaucratic 
politics model as a framework and evaluating players, decision games, and outcomes, 
the choice to employ SOF is replayed and outcomes are evaluated in an empirical light. 
 
United States of America. United States Army. Special Operations Command. SOF Support to  
Political Warfare. March 10, 2015.  
http://www.soc.mil/swcs/ProjectGray/Support%20to%20Political%20Warfare%20White
%20Paper%20v2.3-RMT%20(10MAR2015)%20%20%20.pdf. 
 
Political Warfare is a strategy suited to achieve U.S. national objectives through reduced 
visibility in the international geo-political environment, without committing large 
military forces. Likewise, Political Warfare can function as a critical, integrating element 
of U.S. national power against non-state adversaries such as the current Islamic State in 
Iraq and the Levant. Most often, the Department of Defense role in Political Warfare will 
be one of supporting other U.S. Government agencies that are more likely to lead 
strategy and planning development.  
ENVIRONMENTAL & ECONOMIC ISSUES 
MARINE RESOURCES 
Stavridis, James G., and Johan Bergenas. "The Fishing Wars Are Coming." The Washington Post,  
September 13, 2017. https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-fishing-wars-are-
coming/2017/09/13/05c75208-97c6-11e7-b569-
3360011663b4_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.47630a8a9829. 
 
The deployment of both hard and soft power to acquire natural resources is nothing 
short of hybrid warfare. Countries on the receiving end of Chinese actions are 
responding in kind: Indonesia has blown up hundreds of vessels fishing in their waters 
illegally; Argentina sank a Chinese vessel illegally fishing in its waters last year; and 
South Africa continues to clash with Beijing over fishing practices. 
 
Clarke, Alex. "Protecting the Exclusive Economic Zones – Part I." Center for International  
Maritime Security. November 18, 2014. http://cimsec.org/protecting-exclusive-
economic-zones-part/13637. 
 
An EEZ is the area of sea/sea bed that a nation administers, for want of a better phrase 
‘owns’, and therefore can control/monetize the extraction of resources (such as Fish, 
Gas, Gold or Manganese) from, and which are becoming increasingly important to 
national economies – in fact their societies as a whole. However, a nation cannot 
control or monetize anything if it doesn’t actually have control of it, and just as a city 
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cannot be policed from the secured, nor a battlefield secured just from air, neither can 
an EEZ. 
THE OPENING ARCTIC 
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person-command-in-norfolk. 
 
Faced with a more active Russian fleet and increasing military competition across the 
world, the Navy has elected to reestablish U.S. 2nd Fleet to manage assets closer to the 
homeland, according to a memo announcing the command obtained by USNI News. 
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south-china-sea-and-arctic-ocean/. 
 
This new episode in the evolving relationship of history, treaty law for UNCLOS, and 
customary international law may set the stage for contention in the South China Sea to 
dredge up historical problems surrounding the politics of international law in the Arctic 
Ocean. 
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Shaped by changing climates – political as well as planetary – our understanding of 
security in the Arctic has morphed since the Cold War and continues to take on new 
forms. 
 
Sergunin, Alexander. "Is Russia Going Hard or Soft in the Arctic?" The Wilson Quarterly,  
Summer 2017. https://wilsonquarterly.com/quarterly/into-the-arctic/is-russia-going-
hard-or-soft-in-the-arctic/. 
 
Is Russia igniting a new arms race in the Far North or taking justifiable steps to defend 
its interests in a changing environment? The answer to that question depends greatly on 
whom you ask, where they are, and just how much they appreciate the range of issues 
that factor into Russia’s Arctic policy. 
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East Asia." Foreign Policy Research Institute, January 22, 2015. 
https://www.fpri.org/article/2015/01/how-china-exploits-a-loophole-in-international-
law-in-pursuit-of-hegemony-in-east-asia/. 
 
By using asymmetric maritime forces – principally fishing vessels and coast guard ships – 
China is slowly but surely absorbing the South China Sea and East China Sea into its 
domain. And it does so by exploiting a loophole in international law created by the 
International Court of Justice that makes it impossible for regional states to respond 
effectively. This legal dimension of the international politics of the maritime disputes in 
East Asia is not widely understood, but it is at the core of Chinese strategy in the region. 
 
Smith, Jeff M., and Joshua Eisenman. "China and America Clash on the High Seas: The EEZ  
Challenge." The National Interest, May 22, 2014. 
http://nationalinterest.org/feature/china-america-clash-the-high-seas-the-eez-
challenge-10513. 
 
While working to construct better conflict resolution mechanisms and improve relations 
with the PLAN, Washington must continue to emphasize that its policy is not subject to 
fear, intimidation, coercion, or reckless behavior from Chinese naval or coastal defense 
forces. This should include maintaining an active schedule of surveillance activities, 
patrolling, and freedom of navigation operations. This position is not only within the 
U.S. national interest, but also supported by domestic and international law. Were the 
U.S. to accept China’s interpretation of UNCLOS, U.S. military vessels could be barred 
from operating in the roughly one-third of the world’s oceans that are now EEZs. 
 
